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In October 1997 South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) held a three day hearing into the role of the
"legal community" - the role of law and lawyers during apartheid.
This was but one of the hearings into the role of professions and
institutions during apartheid; the others included hearings into
the role of the media, the health sector, business and labour,
the "faith community" or religious organisations, and the
prisons. These hearings were set up by the TRC in terms of its
understanding of its broad mandate to establish "as complete a
picture as possible of the causes, nature and extent of the gross
violations of human rights ... including the antecedents,
circumstances, factors and context of such violations".2 What
made these professional and institutional hearings different from
the other hearings which the TRC held is that their purpose was
not to establish who is a victim or who may get amnesty. Rather,
they were inquiries into how professions and institutions which
on the face of it seemed no different than their counterparts in
Europe or North America were deeply implicated in apartheid.3
Much of the focus of debate during the Legal Hearing was on
the role of judges. This came about partly because judges singled
themselves out from those invited to attend the Legal Hearing by
refusing to attend, though quite a few made written
submissions.' But this absence merely intensified and made
rather rancorous an inevitable concentration on the judicial
role, since it is in what judges do that the central question
about the rule of law - the relationship between law and
justice - is manifested. Indeed, the question of that
relationship was the first issue on the list of items the TRC
asked its invitees to consider.
Perhaps the most powerful testimony of the Hearing was given
by Paula McBride, a human rights activist, who delivered an
indictment of judges for having imposed the death penalty on
soldiers of the liberation movements even when they had the
option of finding that there were mitigating circumstances. She
dwelt on the case of Andrew Zondo, a 19 year old soldier of the
African National Congress, convicted of planting a mine in 1985
which killed 5 people in a South African shopping centre. Youth
was among the factors a judge could take into account in avoiding
imposing the otherwise mandatory death penalty for a crime of
this nature. But Zondo was sentenced to death by Rayraon Leon, a
liberal judge of the most liberal bench - Natal - in South
Africa. After sentence was passed Zondo said:
"I listened to the Prosecutor and I saw that he did not have
any ideas about us. He was ignorant of our ways and
feelings. I looked at the Judge and the prosecutor and the
thought came to me that they were ants and in engaging with
them we were dwarfing ourselves. It is a curse to be a Judge
when you believe that you hold the life of a person in your
hand. Only God holds our lives in his hands. He gives it and
He alone can take it."5
The question about whether judges can be more than ants is,
in my view, the same as the central question about the rule of
law - whether there is an intrinsic relationship between law and
justice. That there is such a relationship was assumed by many of
the central figures at the Hearing. For example, in his opening
address Archbishop Desmond Tutu said that the Legal Hearing was
the "most important of the professional hearings", almost as
important as the "victim/survivor hearings".6 And he excoriated
the judges for their failure to attend. Judges, he said, were
faced with moral choices under apartheid and generally they had
made the wrong one. They had been faced with another choice -
-whether to appear before the TRC, and again they had made the
wrong choice. This showed, he said, that they "had not yet
changed a mindset that properly belongs to the old dispensation
There is a legitimate question about both the Legal
Hearing's and my own focus on judges. After all, judges are but a
small part of any legal order; indeed, they are a small part of
any legal order's judicial system if we conceive such a system as
including all those officials charged with making authoritative
determinations of the legal rights of those subject to the law.
The cutting edge of any legal order - the place where subject
meets the law - is going for the most part to be in the
enforcement of the law by the police and in the adjudication of
disputes about the law by magistrates. For this reason, some
thought that the focus on judges at the Hearing distracted the
TRC's inquiry from more important issues.
However, I believe such a focus to be productive. Robert
Cover, an American Professor of Law, showed why this is the case
in his pioneering work on a group of judges in antebellum America
who, despite their commitment to the abolitionist cause, almost
relentlessly interpreted laws enforcing slavery in such a way as
to shore up the institution of slavery."
Cover pointed out that studies of the relationship between
law and justice - a relationship highlighted when one studies the
role of law in implementing and sustaining injustice - for the
most part accepted "the perspective of the established order".'
For such studies took the drama of the "disobedient" as exemplary
of the problem - the stories of those who appeal to a "juster
justice" beyond the law to justify disobedience.10
Such disobedients, and any study which makes them exemplary
of the relationship between law and justice, take the perspective
of the established order because they assume that the law is what
the powerful in that order suppose it to be. Such disobedients
make their moral stand on the basis of the utter injustice of the
law, an injustice created by the arbitrary will of a powerful and
unjust ruler. And they therefore exclude the possibility that the
law is more than the static embodiment of some ruler's will,
determinable as a matter of plain fact.
It is important, Cover thought, that a study of law and
justice canvass that excluded possibility by asking whether the
law provides opportunities to do justice which rulers, no matter
how powerful they are, cannot completely control. Only that
possibility allows that the relationship between law and justice
might be an intrinsic one, one which creates tensions within the
law when the powerful use the law as an instrument of oppression.
Cover argues that it is adjudication by judges which best
manifests the tensions which arise out of that intrinsic
relationship when law is put in the service of injustice. For
judges everywhere claim that their duty is not simply to
administer the law, but to administer justice. Indeed, the oath
of office which South African judges swore during apartheid
stated that they would "administer justice to all persons alike
without without fear, favour or prejudice, and, as the
circumstances of any particular case may require, in accordance
with the law and customs of the Republic of South Africa"."
As I pointed out in my own submission to the Legal Hearing,
one can adopt the view that the justice of the law mentioned in
the oath is simply the conception of justice which, as a matter
of fact, the powerful have used the law to implement.12
Alternatively, one can read some significance into the word
justice, for example, by noting that the oath would look rather
odd if one substituted for "justice" the phrase "ideology of the
powerful".
Encapsulated in these two ways of viewing the relationship
between law and justice is the age-old debate in the philosophy
of law between legal positivists and natural law theory.
Positivists argue that the relationship between law and "juster
justice" or true justice is purely contingent on political
circumstance, while the natural lawyers argue that there is some
intrinsic relationship. The complexity of that debate, especially
in its more technical aspects, goes well beyond the confines of
this essay.13
But an important, and I would argue the principal, aspect of
that debate is illuminated by a focus on the role of judges at
the TRC, even though their role was confined to some written
submissions. For if we are concerned with the relationship
between law and justice, then, as Cover says, we cannot study
that relationship without maintaining the possibility that it is
an intrinsic one. The relationship has to be intrinsic if law is
to provide a place where those subject to it can contest it when
it is used as an instrument of brute and arbitrary power.
Only if the relationship is intrinsic can law provide the basis
for judges to be more than the ants whom young Andrew Zondo
encountered in the trial which culminated in his judicially-
ordered death.
I will argue that the conclusion one should reach is a
heartening one - there is an intrinsic relationship between law
and justice demonstrated by the few South African lawyers who
commited themselves to finding justice within the law. Moreover,
their commitment laid the basis for a significant role for law
and lawyers in South Africa's inevitably difficult transition to
becoming a fully functioning and stable democracy.
However, the path to that conclusion is often a difficult
one. I have already mentioned that the judge McBride condemned
for his failure to find mitigating circumstances for Andrew Zondo
was a liberal judge on South Africa's most liberal bench. And one
of the peculiarities of the Hearing was that those few lawyers -
I will refer to them as liberal lawyers - who did commit
themselves to the cause of justice often came in for harsh
criticism. At times it seemed that those who did most got judged
most harshly. I will start by exploring that issue through the
perspective of one of South Africa's most prominent disobedients.
The Case of Bram Fischer
I want to get to the paradox of how law can be used to resist law
by way of the paradox of why the lawyers who did most often
seemed under the harshest scrutiny. As we will see, that second
paradox shows how questions about the politics of memory are
entwined with questions about the politics of the rule of law.
Here the case of Abram "Bram" Fischer is exemplary, one brought
to the attention of the TRC through the written and oral
submissions made by the federal body of South African advocates -
the General Council of the Bar (GCB)."
At issue here was the striking off of Fischer from the roll
of advocates, a move initiated by his own Bar - the Johannesburg
Bar, the most liberal component of the GCB. Fischer, as the GCB's
submission notes, was son of the Judge President of the Orange
Free State and the grandson of the Prime Minister of the Orange
River Colony, the political entity which came into being between
the end of the Boer War and the establishment of the Union of
South Africa in 1910. He became one of South Africa's leading
advocates, a position he maintained in the 1950s and early 1960s
despite the fact that he was a prominent member of the South
African Communist Party. In 1964 he was charged with various
offences under the Suppression of Communism Act (1950), in
reaction to which the Communist Party had dissolved itself and
gone underground. Fischer was permitted to leave South Africa on
bail to argue a case before the Privy Council in London since the
court accepted that a man of his integrity would not estreat -
break the conditions of - his bail. Fischer returned to stand
trial, which commenced in November 1964. In January of 1965 he
failed to attend his trial, leaving a letter for his legal
representative explaining his reasons. Here are some extracts:
"I wish you to inform the court that my absence, though
deliberate, is not intended in any way to be disrespectful.
... I have not taken this step lightly. As you will no doubt
understand, I have experienced great conflict between my
desire to stay with my fellow accused and, on the other
hand, to try to continue the political work I believe to be
essential. My decision was made only because I believe that
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it is the duty of every true opponent of this government to
remain in this country and to oppose its monstrous policy of
apartheid with every means in its power. That is what I
shall do for as long as I can. ... Cruel, discriminatory
laws multiply each year, bitterness and hatred of the
government and its laws are growing daily. No outlet for
this hatred is permitted because political rights have been
removed. National organisations have been outlawed and
leaders not in gaol have been banned from speaking and
meeting. People are hounded by Pass Laws and by Group Areas
Controls. Torture by solitary confinement, and worse, has
been legalised by an elected parliament - surely an event
unique in history. ... Unless this whole intolerable system
is changed radically and rapidly disaster must follow.
Appalling bloodshed and civil war will become inevitable
because, as long as there is oppression of a majority such
oppression will be fought with increasing hatred. ... These
are my reasons for absenting myself from court. If by my
fight I can encourage even some people to think about, to
understand and to abandon the policies they now so blindly
follow, I shall not regret any punishment I may incur. I can
no longer serve justice in the way I have attempted to do
during the past thirty years. I can only do so in the way I
have now chosen."15
Just two days later, the Johannesburg Bar Council instructed its
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attorneys to prepare an application to court for the removal of
Fisdher's name from the roll of advocates. Shortly afterwards
Fischer wrote another letter to his legal representative,
expressing his dismay at the haste with which the Johannesburg
Bar Council had acted. He was also distressed by the fact that
the decision had been taken without any attempt to get his side
heard."
In his letter, Fischer strongly defended himself against the
charge of conduct "unbefitting that of an advocate" entailed in
an application to strike off:
"The principle upon which I rely is a simple one, firmly
established in South African legal tradition. Since the days
of the South African War," if not since the Jameson
Raid,18 it has been recognised that political offences,
committed because of a belief in the overriding moral
validity of a political principle, do not in themselves
justify the disbarring of a person from practising the
profession of the law. Presumably this is so because it is
assumed that the commission of such offences has no bearing
on the professional integrity of the person concerned.
When an advocate does what I have done, his conduct is not
determined by any disrespect for the law nor because he
hopes to benefit personally by 'any offence' he may commit.
On the contrary, it requires an act of will to overcome his
deeply rooted respect of legality, and he takes the step
only when he feels that, whatever the consequences to
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himself, his political conscience no longer permits him to
do otherwise. He does it not because of a desire to be
immoral, but because to do otherwise would, for him, be
immoral."
Fischer went on to say that he had returned to South Africa
determined to see his trial through. But his experience of facing
trial on evidence extracted from detainees held under the 90 day
detention law -the "gross injustice (apart from the cruelty) of
this barbaric law" - convinced him that no prosecution which
depended on evidence "extracted" during such detention could be
considered fair. In addition, he thought he might be facing the
kind of "indeterminate sentence" which the Minister of Justice
had discretion to impose and of which he said "we have already
seen how European [i.e. white] public opinion has failed to
register any protest against this arbitrary, indefinite
incarceration and has complacently accepted this total abolition
of the rule of law". He thus found himself compelled, he said,
into a stance of
"open defiance, whatever the consequences might be, of a
process of law which has become a travesty of all civilised
tradition: A political belief is outlawed, then torture is
applied to gather evidence and finally the Executive
decides whether you serve a life sentence or not.
I cannot believe that any genuine protest made against this
system which has been constructed solely to further
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apartheid can be regarded as immoral or as justifying the
disbarment of a member of our profession."19
However, the Johannesburg Bar went ahead with its
application to have him struck off. The court held that he should
be struck off: he had been guilty of dishonest conduct because he
had used his status as senior counsel to get bail and someone who
took an attitude of defiance to the law could not serve the
law."
The GCB comments:
"Those who took the decision to apply for the striking of
Fischer's name from the roll of advocates must have been
confronted with an invidious problem. They namely recognised
that Fischer had been 'regarded by the Courts of the
Republic, by the members of the Johannesburg Bar and by
other legal practitioners as a most honourable and
trustworthy member of the Bar' who had at all times
'observed the highest ethical standards of legal practice'
and had been 'in every respect a worthy and distinguished
member of the legal profession'.21 They believed that
notwithstanding the esteem in which Fischer was held by all,
the deception to the Court, coming as it did from a senior
practitioner, justified the striking off. There is no doubt
that even in 1965, the issue was painful and divisive for
those involved. Many of the leaders of the Johannesburg Bar
felt that their personal relationship with Fischer was such
that they would not be willing to appear in the application
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for his striking off. Thus it was that the then chairman of
the GCB who practises in Durban, was approached to move the
application. For him, the task was a distressing one, since
he too had a great respect and liking for Fischer. ...
Today, with the benefit of hindsight, there is a different
perspective. Fischer was confronted with an acute dilemma.
He was torn between his fidelity to law, which he had served
faithfully for many years and his profound commitment to
opposing the injustices of apartheid. He acted not out of
self-interest but from political and moral conviction. Far
from securing any personal advantage, he realised that his
actions would result in increased punishment."
The GCB then reported that the Johannesburg Bar Council believes
now that "a grave injustice" was done to Fischer and it
apologised to his family."
The full presentation of the record here is to the credit
of the GCB for it shows just how difficult memory's struggle is
and how great is the temptation to manage it." Unexplained in
the GCB's submission is the phrase "with the benefit of hindsight
...". That phrase does not mean that one is engaging in a simple
act of memory but that one can see things now that one was not
able to see earlier. But since Fischer made the situation crystal
clear at the time, hindsight is not required for gaining the
"different perspective" but for understanding why the Bar chose
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to evade the issues presented by Fischer. And this perspective
was not unique to Fischer - Leslie Blackwell Q.C., a former judge
of the Supreme Court, published an article in the Sunday Times
sympathetic to Fischer's case.2'
The GCB not only invited the question of how hindsight was
relevant when Fischer, whose moral stature it recognised both in
1965 and at the Hearing, had presented the moral complexity of
his situation fully at the time. It also failed to deal with the
fact that Fischer's situation was morally complex in part because
of legal factors. Although Fischer had estreated bail, he had not
clearly estreated the conditions imposed on him when he was
initially granted bail. He had come back to stand trial and, as
he explained, it was his experience on his return which had led
him to view his situation in a different light. More important,
the argument he made based on that experience was one about the
absence of the rule of law in South Africa. Not only were his
concerns related to the fact that the majority of South Africa's
population had no political rights and to the fact that legal
political opposition had been closed to them, but also to the
fact that his trial, as well as the sentence he might face, were
in violation of his understanding of the rule of the law. That
is, even if it were the case, as he was prepared to grant, that
his decision to go underground was in violation of his initial
undertaking, the reasons for his decision could not reflect
negatively on his integrity as an advocate.
The "invidiousness" of the Johannesburg Bar's situation was
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one entirely of their own making. Their "indecent haste", as
Fischer's daughters termed it," to get Fischer struck off meant
that the Bar took the initiative from the government in
discrediting Fischer, thus helping to obscure the message he
hoped to send his fellow white South Africans. As Fischer himself
said in his letter, though the GCB did not quote this particular
sentence, his "contention" was that "if in the year 1965 I have
to be removed from the roll of practising advocates, the Minister
himself and not the Bar Council should do the dirty work"." The
culpability of the Johannesburg Bar is only increased by the fact
that their personal discomfort with this action led them to try
to avoid the appearance of doing the dirty work by getting an
advocate from another Bar to argue the matter in court.
To this day, the advocate who argued the application in
court on behalf of the bar, Douglas Shaw Q.C., maintains that
there is no basis to the allegation that the application was
inspired by political motives." And the GCB emphasizes in its
submission that the fact that "Fischer was facing charges of a
political character" formed no part of the basis for the
application for striking off.28
But the Minutes of the Bar Council meetings on the subject
of the application to remove Fischer - reproduced in volume 3 of
the GCB's submission - reveal a process of communication with the
Minister of Justice on this topic which suggest a negotiation
about how best to play down the politics of the application."
And while it is true that, technically speaking, the application
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for striking off referred only to Fischer's decision to break the
conditions of his bail, the Bar's narrowing of the issue to one
about the personal integrity of an advocate, entirely abstracted
from the political context of South Africa, was a deeply
political act. It was and is a way of refusing to confront the
wider political and rule of law implications of Fischer's
decision, implications which were intimately connected to the
charges he was facing and the "legal" process of a political
trial. One can only conclude that when one of the Bar's number
tried to force them to see over the apartheid divide, they
reacted by sacrificing him in order to avoid the view.
In my view, Bram Fischer's story is central to any account
of the choices South African lawyers faced during apartheid. The
history of apartheid law can be roughly divided into ten year
periods: in the 1950s the apartheid divide was legislated; in the
1960s the security apparatus to repress opposition to apartheid
was legislated and eventually consolidated; in the 1970s cracks
in the ideology behind the divide and in the law which maintained
it started to appear but were patched over by ruthless use of the
force licenced by the security legislation; in the 1980s, the
divide fractured, was maintained for a while by force, but was
eventually destroyed, a feat in which lawyers played a
significant role.
As the Legal Hearing showed, lawyers when looking back over
this period like both to dwell on the period of the 1980s, when
some of their number were most active in opposing apartheid, and
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to claim that opposition to apartheid through the law was usually
futile, as demonstrated by the fruitless representations to the
government which the professional associations on occasion made.
In the case of the professional associations, the tension is
most exposed for the attorneys. During the 1960s they were almost
totally silent about the erosion of the rule of law. For the
advocates, the tension comes about because at this same time, the
most liberal of the Bars took part in the repression of one of
its own - Bram Fischer. Moreover, it took that part in the face
of an explicit and powerful challenge which Fischer threw down to
South African lawyers.
Fischer did not simply ask these lawyers to confront their
role in sustaining the injustice of the law. He tried to get them
to see that there was more wrong with the law than that it was
being used in the cause of unjust policies. He argued that any
lawyer who wished to maintain respect for the rule of law had to
question whether the ideal of the rule of law was not in fact
better served by violating the law.
Fischer clearly regarded this question as an open one, to be
decided by each individual. As we know, he decided that the only
way he could participate in building a society founded on respect
for the rule of law was to go underground in order to join the
illegal armed struggle. But we also know that he hoped that his
example, the example of an Afrikaner aristocrat who had
established himself as one of the leaders of the legal
profession, would make other lawyers rethink their role within
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the legal order. And that was, I think, because he regarded
himself as in a genuine dilemma. However repugnant he found the
apartheid legal order, it remained a legal order - an order in
which there were still the vestiges of the rule of law - and his
respect for the law still exerted a pull on him which he found
difficult to resist.
As Stephen Clingman shows in his excellent biography of
Fischer, Fischer's decision to return from England to stand trial
in the face of considerable pressure from his comrades in exile
abroad, his courtesy to his legal representative and to the
judicial officers presiding at his trial, and his great concern
about the uncomfortable situation he had created for his legal
representative, were all occasioned by his continuing respect for
the law, even as he planned to go underground. And as we have
seen, it was the complete lack of understanding of most of his
colleagues at the Johannesburg Bar of his position, evidenced by
their haste to join in the government's attack on him as a
political dissident, which so distressed him.30
The rule of law dilemma which Fischer faced casts into sharp
relief all the other dilemmas which South African lawyers faced.
The best description of Fischer's kind of rule of law dilemma is
found in an essay by the distinguished philosopher Christine
Korsgaard.31 Korsgaard says the following of a morally
upstanding citizen who contemplates joining a revolution against
the established order:
"When the very institution whose purpose is to realize human
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rights is used to trample them, when justice is turned
against itself, the virtue of justice will be turned against
itself too. Concern for human rights leads the virtuous
person to accept the authority of the law, but in such
circumstances adherence to the law will lead her to support
institutions that systematically violate human rights. The
person with the virtue of justice, the lover of human
rights, unable to turn to the actual laws for their
enforcement, has nowhere else to turn. She may come to feel
that there is nothing for it but to take human rights under
her own protection, and so to take the law into her own
hands.""
Korsgaard suggests that such a decision is ethically
different from most decisions we make. It is not the
"imperfection" of justice - justice which fails to measure up to
our sense of right and wrong - which is the basis for our
decision. Rather the basis is the "perversion" of justice - the
sense that it is injustice disguised as justice. Given the
consequences that likely attend overthrowing an established
order, the revolutionary cannot, she thinks, claim that he is
justified in resorting to revolution. "That consolation is denied
him. It is as if a kind of gap opens up in the moral world in
which the moral agent must stand alone".33 Korsgaard thus
maintains that justification in such matters is always
retrospective - everything depends on whether the revolutionary
is successful in establishing a stable government."
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Where Korsgaard goes wrong, however, is in suggesting
thai the decision has to be made in a moral gap or void. Fischer
had no doubt that whatever the future would in fact say, he was
at the time justified in taking his step. The difference between
his own understanding of his situation and Korsgaard's is that he
does not quite adopt the perspective which we saw Robert Cover
term the "perspective of the disobedient", "the perspective of
the established order"." For although Fischer appealed, like
Cover's disobedient, to a "juster justice"36 beyond the law to
justify his disobedience, his perspective on the law was not
entirely external. As we have seen, his appeal was also meant to
awaken South African lawyers to the possibility for them of the
pursuit of the ideal of juster justice within the law. In
contrast, Korsgaard's analysis seems to suggest that for the
disobedient revolutionary only the external "disobedient"
perspective is available. But that would mean that there was no
real dilemma, at least no moral dilemma.37
Clingman also seems to rely on the external disobedient
perspective in his exploration of the nature of Fischer's choice
in 1965. He rejects the view that Fischer's life was a tragedy in
the classical sense in which a great individual contributes to
his fall "through some crucial error or flaw", preferring the
idea that Fischer had to pay the price of an uncompromising stand
on the side of right against the "unregenerate force of
apartheid".38 Here Clingman suggests that for Fischer the
situation was one of a clash between opposites - evil might and
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total right.
Fischer's choice had of course tragic consequences for him
personally. He died in 1975 when those involved in the struggle
against apartheid had few grounds for hope. And that choice
committed him to an armed struggle which had tragic consequences
for others, consequences, as Korsgaard suggests, which attend any
decision to engage in revolution. Even if one considers the turn
to armed struggle by the African National Congress (ANC) in the
early 1960s as a completely justified reaction to government
repression, one has to admit that the ANC's decision gave the
apartheid government the excuse to engage in a no-holds barred
war which escalated into the tale of human cruelty with which the
TRC has had to deal. And one can give the ANC the moral high
ground in this war and still hold the ANC responsible, as the TRC
has, for its own gross human rights abuses." Indeed, the idea
for the TRC was born in an ANC initiative in the early 1990s to
appoint commissions to inquire into its record of brutality to
its own soldiers in ANC training camps." In other words, the
decision to engage in armed struggle was one whose human
consequences could be predicted without having been able to
predict the ultimate result. And it is unimaginable that someone
as far-sighted and ethically rigorous as Fischer took his
decision without accepting responsibility for these consequences.
However, at least from the institutional perspective of the
rule of law, the idea of a clash between two opposites, and of a
decision in a moral void, does not get exactly right the tragic
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nature of Fischer's choice in 1965.
We can think of a morally tragic situation as being one in
which no choice can be made without ignoring the legitimate pull
of important moral considerations. We have nevertheless to choose
in such situations. And we have to try to make the best choice
without the comfort - however the choice turns out - that the
ignored considerations will cease to be legitimate. Even when one
seems vindicated in retrospect, all one can say is that one did
the best one could and that one is deeply sorry about one's
complicity in the moral wrongs that resulted from one's choice.
Recall that at the same time as Fischer made his choice to
go underground, he hoped by it to encourage others to take a
different decision. And it is worth noting that Nelson Mandela
seems to have been occupied by the same issue in the 1960s. He
says that at the time of the trial which resulted in his own
sentence to life imprisonment, he urged Fischer - leader of the
defence team - who was already considering going underground, not
to take this route. Mandela says that he stressed that Fischer
"served the struggle best in the courtroom, where people could
see this Afrikaner son of a judge president fighting for the
rights of the powerless"."
In other words, Fischer and Mandela did not adopt a simple
strategy of fighting an illegal war against an unjust state in
order to establish a just one." They thought that it was
important that at the same time war be fought by legal means in
order to keep alive an idea put to the Legal Hearing by Vincent
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Saldanha, leader of the delegation from the National Association
of Democratic Lawyers which had been formed in order to provide a
home for lawyers determined to use the law to resist apartheid.
He had this to say about the lawyers involved in the radical
opposition to apartheid:
"[While we] took an oath of allegiance to the state, we
certainly did not take an oath of allegiance to the
apartheid state. If anything, we took an oath of allegiance
to undermine the apartheid state, and I think a distinction
must be drawn. That's why we distinguish ourselves from the
establishment lawyers or the lawyers who operated within the
Law Societies under the particular milieu and ideological
context they did. We worked with these lawyers, we used the
law as a terrain of struggle, unashamedly, and to that
extent would continue to use the law as a terrain presently
in furtherance of the principles and the values of the new
Constitution"."
In order for that distinction - one between the government which
brings about the enactment of the law and the law of the state to
which the government itself is subject - to have any basis,
right can never be entirely on the side of one who decides to
overthrow an order which still contains vestiges of the rule of
law. Indeed, besides the costs to human beings that follow a
decision to overthrow an established order, the revolutionary has
to take into account the costs armed struggle imposes on respect
for the rule of law, a respect which might prove important during
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the period of instability which inevitably follows the overthrow
of the old order. But the revolutionary can seek to justify his
actions here and now in making his decision, as long as he
recognises the pull of competing considerations and thus the
moral worth of the other decision.
In South Africa that other decision, the decision to use the
law to oppose the law, had almost as momentous a result as the
decision to turn to armed struggle. In this regard, Clingman
takes care to note that lawyers who worked with Fischer and who
represented him - most notably Arthur Chaskalson - continued and
even extended his work in the courts. Clingman points in
particular to Chaskalson's co-founding of the Legal Resources
Centre in 1978 - the most important base of legal challenges to
apartheid - and to his recent appointment to the Presidency of
South Africa's Constitutional Court. And he records that Use
Fischer, Bram Fischer's daughter, was employed at the Centre as
librarian, and "had the pleasure of seeing, on a daily basis, her
father's law library, housed at the Centre at a time when so
little of Brain's life had any public legitimacy". Clingman
continues: "Yet that aspect changed as well: in June 1995 Nelson
Mandela gave the first Bram Fischer Memorial Lecture in
Johannesburg, and one year later the Bram Fischer Memorial
Library was formally opened at the Legal Resources Centre, again
by President Mandela"."
Thus, while Fischer was a South African of altogether
exceptional moral stature," the way he lived his life set an
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example for all other white South Africans, particularly lawyers.
His choice, while tragic, was one which could be justified even
at the time he made it, whatever the result. For the manner of
its making opened up moral space for those who did not want to
follow him, preferring to make their stand against apartheid from
within the law. And, while they cannot be condemned for having
decided to opt for the politics of legal opposition, they can and
should be judged by how they behaved within that space.
However, those who took that stand had to cope with the
moral question mark raised by the fact that one could with
justification claim that the rule of law was best served by the
politics pf armed struggle. This was especially true for lawyers
whose path of legal resistance to the law involved using the law
against the law. Not only did they make themselves vulnerable to
being judged by their own standards, in contrast to the vast
majority of lawyers who either actively supported apartheid or
who were merely content to ignore oppression while reaping the
benefits of legal practice. It was also the case that the more
successful they were at using the law to challenge the law, the
more they legitimated the legal order by helping to vindicate the
government's claim to be part of the family of states committed
to such fundamental Western values as the rule of law.
In the next section, I explore the question about why that
situation could arise at all, that is, why it was the case that
the space existed for law to be used to resist law.
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Dilemmas of the Rule of Law
In nearly all the cases which are regarded as landmark decisions
by the South African courts during the apartheid era, the basic
question the judges had to answer concerned whether they should
impose constraints of legality on executive decisions, including
decisions about how to implement apartheid policy, decisions
about the suppression of political opposition and the detention
of opponents, and decisions about the content of regulations made
under statutory powers. Examples of the legal principles at issue
included the following: the principle that policy should be
implemented in a reasonable or non-discriminatory fashion; the
principle that someone whose rights are affected by an official
decision has a right to be heard before that decision is made;
the principle that, when a statute says that an official must
have reason to believe that X is the case before he acts, the
court should require that reasons be produced sufficient to
justify that belief; the principle that no executive decision can
encroach on a fundamental right, for example, the right to have
access to a court and to legal advice, unless the empowering
statute specifically authorises that encroachment; the principle
that regulations made under vast discretionary powers, for
example, the power to make regulations declaring and dealing with
a state of emergency, must be capable of being defended in a
court of law by a demonstration that there are genuine
circumstances of the kind which justify invoking the power and
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that the powers actually invoked are demonstrably related to the
purpose of the empowering statute.
It is very important to understand why such principles are
fundamental principles of legality. Take the principle that no
executive decision can encroach on the fundamental right to have
access to a court and to legal advice, unless the empowering
statute specifically authorises that encroachment. That principle
became particularly important in the period after 1960 in South
Africa because the government sought to insulate detention from
the scrutiny of the courts by barring in its legislation access
by the courts or any other person to detainees. That meant it
became almost impossible to challenge the legality of a
particular detention which in turn meant that the violence of the
administration could be exercised without any legal control. In
such circumstances, the courts cannot be said to be administering
"the law" because there is no law to which one can hold public
officials to account.
Moreover, the law which the courts are failing to enforce
does not primarily consist of rules which owe their existence to
positive enactment by a legislature or explicit recognition a
court. Rather, this law consists of the principles which make
sense of the idea of government under the rule of law, the idea
that such government is subject to the constraints of principles
such as fairness, reasonableness, and equality of treatment. One
will expect such principles to be manifested in statutes and in
judgments, but for the reason that it is only in making these
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principles manifest that legislatures and courts can give some
content to the idea of the rule of law, of the accountability of
public officials to the law.46
In a legal order where the legislature is supreme, judicial
scrutiny of official conduct for its legality is of course to
some extent conditional on the legislature not saying explicitly
that it wishes its administration to act illegally. The
qualification is necessary because judges, in meeting their duty
to administer the justice of the law, should take pains to find
their legislature not guilty of wanting to subvert the rule of
law. That duty explains why judges should require very explicit
expressions by the legislature of an intention to evade the
constraints of legality.
Had the majority of judges applied the law in a way that
made best sense of their judicial oath, the government would have
had to choose one of two options. It could have openly announced
that it could not both abide by the rule of law and maintain
apartheid as it wanted, thus explicitly choosing a lawless
course, or it could have subjected its administration to the
constraint of the fundamental legal principles sketched
earlier.
The first option would have significantly decreased support
for the government both in the international community and at
home.47 And had the government taken this option, judges
faithful to their duty could have denounced such statutes for
illegality - not for lack of compliance with some extra-legal
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ideal of justice, but for failing to be law. In other words,
judges could then condemn the law not simply because they
disagreed with it, but because the law profaned principles
fundamental to maintaining legal order. In contrast, the second
option - government submission to the rule of law - would have
opened up precious space for opposition to apartheid from within.
In either case, the judges would have confronted the
government with a rule of law dilemma. We saw that dilemma
manifest itself for Bram Fischer as he contemplated taking his
fight against apartheid underground. In his case, the dilemma was
a genuinely moral one. His commitment to the rule of law required
him to recognise that the values which he decided to pursue by
revolutionary means were put at risk by a revolutionary course,
and, more important, could still be fought for by legal means. In
other words, the moral quality of his dilemma stems from the fact
that a commitment to the rule of law informs both of its options.
In the case of the South African government, however, the
rule of law dilemma was not moral but strategic. It was a dilemma
between accepting the costs as well as the benefits of operation
under the rule of law or doing without the legitimacy which
attaches to government under the rule of law.
In confronting the government with the strategic rule of law
dilemma, judges would have affirmed their commitment to a process
that "does not defer to the violence of administration";"
rather, the process seeks to impose the constraints of legality
on a state which licences that imposition by its claim to be a
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Rechtsstaat - to be a state which governs in accordance with the
rule of law. Such a commitment exhibits fidelity to the law
because it shows that the rationale for having courts is their
potential to articulate and maintain a "constitutional
vision"," one informed by an understanding that the duty judges
undertook in their oath to administer the law was one to
"administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or
prejudice".
The South African judiciary let the government escape from
that rule of law dilemma and for that the judges are accountable,
and not only for dereliction of duty. They are also accountable
for having facilitated the shadows and secrecy of the world in
which the security forces operated and for permitting the
unrestrained implementation of apartheid policy. They thus bear
some responsibility for the bitter legacy of hurt which has been
the main focus of the TRC.50
To place the government in that dilemma would have been a
deeply political act and judges do not like to be seen to be
engaging in politics. But, as I argued in my submission," when
the politics in which judges engage amount to upholding the rule
of law, requiring of a government that it live up to ideals which
it itself - however cynically - professes, then judges are simply
doing the duty undertaken in their oath of office. They are
demonstrating their accountability to the law to which
governments, who wish to claim the legitimacy of government
through the medium of the rule of law, are also accountable.
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Judges who assume that a legislature must be taken to intend
to respect the rule of law do so in order to make sense of their
role as one faithful to the duty to administer the law. And that
tells us that the judges' duty is to moral ideals which play a
role in constituting what they should take to be the positive
law, even in the absence of a written constitution which gives
them such authority. If judges fail to do that, the South African
example shows that they fail in their duty as judges.
One must be careful here not to err on the side of over- or
underestimation. Liberal judges could not have stopped apartheid
and one can safely say that any significant act of judicial
resistance would have been overridden by the government. But we
should note that any particular act of resistance by the internal
opposition to apartheid or by the liberation organisations was
likely to be, and in fact usually was, overridden. Further, many
white South Africans did not find it entirely easy to think of
themselves as on the beneficiary side of the apartheid divide.
Even when they were not enthusiastic supporters of apartheid,
they needed to think that they were living in - and helping to
maintain - a basically civilised society. Each time a person from
within the ranks of the white establishment broke those ranks to
point out how uncivilised their society was, the others were
threatened with being forced to rethink their position.
Bram Fischer's example is the most striking here. And there
is no doubt that a mass resignation of the few liberal judges,
judges who condemned apartheid not only as a repugnant ideology
31
but because of its subversion of the rule of law, would have
rocked the government and white South Africans.
However, I believe that the few liberal judges were right to
remain in office despite the fact that once in office a liberal
judge confronted a rule of law dilemma in a particularly painful
way. Even the most liberal judge who took office under apartheid
could not avoid implementing its law. He had often to accept that
even laws whose content he found abhorrent and whose provenance
he regarded as illegitimate had a claim on his duty to administer
the law. He therefore not only made himself complicit in an
injustice he recognised as such, but gave to that injustice the
aura of legitimacy.
In other words, what made a liberal judge different from
other judges was not his complicity in apartheid but his
conception of fidelity to the law. His presence could help to
keep alive the idea that the law provides opportunities to judges
to make the law meet its aspiration to treat all its subjects
equally. However, in keeping that idea alive, he also helped to
legitimate the apartheid government by giving some genuine
substance to the claim that the rule of law did exist in South
Africa.
For the liberal judges, then, it was very much a case of
"damned if you do, damned if you don't". But without them, there
would have been little, perhaps no, point to the efforts of those
few lawyers in the academy in the 1960s and 1970s who sought to
provide their students with a critical perspective on the
32
apartheid legal order, or to the efforts of those few lawyers in
practice - attorneys and advocates - who were prepared to use the
law against the law in the fight against apartheid. The
distinction between the apartheid state and the ideal state which
we saw Vincent Saldanha draw depended on the efforts of all of
these lawyers, but most importantly on the liberal judges, simply
because without an occasional victory in the courts no such
distinction could have been drawn. And without a basis for that
distinction during apartheid, there would have been precious
little reason for the African National Congress to take law
seriously both during the negotiations about the new order and in
the transition to democracy."
Nevertheless, there is a salient difference between academic
critics and political or human rights lawyers, on the one hand,
and liberal judges, on the other. It is not that one legitimates
while the other does not, for it is clear that the participation
of all serves to legitimate. Rather, the difference is that
liberal judges often could not help but allow the injustice of
the law to speak through them. Further, this feature of their
role was not confined to occasions when they had no choice but to
interpret the law as the government wanted it interpreted. Even
when a liberal judge had some room for interpretative manoeuvre
it was usually the case that he could only mitigate to some
extent the injustice of the law."
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Truth. Memory and the Rule of Law
I have noted that no South African judge accepted the TRC's
invitation to testify at the Legal Hearing. Two reasons seemed
paramount in this judicial boycott, a claim that judicial
independence would be compromised and the thought that such
testimony would endanger the fragile bond of collegiality that
exists between judges from the old order who have kept their jobs
and judges appointed under the new order.
However, the claim for immunity because of the need to
protect judicial independence is hollow once one sees that
judicial independence is itself an instrumental virtue: it is
instrumental to ensuring the accountability of judges to the law.
And the majority of old order judges had failed to show fidelity
to the law, had failed to take seriously a judicial oath which
required them "to administer justice". As a Canadian judge once
put it when judges in Canada raised a defence of total immunity
to a summons to testify before a commission of inquiry: "[w]hen
there is a real risk that judicial immunity may be perceived by
the public as being advanced for the protection of the judiciary
rather than for the protection of the justice system, the public
interest ... requires that the question be asked and
answered".54 And in regard to collegiality, one has to take into
account the possibility that the kind of collegiality bought at
the expense of an open and honest debate about the substance of
judicial independence might be a very shallow one, unlikely to
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sustain a judiciary which carries the burden of huge
expectations."
Further, judges, in exempting themselves from the process of
discussion at the TRC while in a few cases making written
submissions, provoked a discussion from which they then held
themselves aloof, thus demonstrating their sense that judges are
not accountable like other citizens. Had even a few judges
accepted the TRC's invitation, not only would this have imparted
a different tone to the Hearing as a whole, but it would have
done more for respect for the law and for the judiciary than any
attempts to present their record in its best possible light.
Accepting the invitation would have shown that judges
acknowledged that they are not above the legal process that seeks
to bridge South Africa's awful past to a democratic future. And
only such an acknowledgment could have demonstrated a proper
awareness that one of the things that made that past so singular
was that the injustice of apartheid was implemented through what
judges like to consider the vehicle for justice - the law.
In particular, such an appearance would have demonstrated
that judges understand that they too are citizens in a democracy,
citizens with special responsibilities, of course. But the weight
of those responsibilities in the context of a fraught transition
to democracy argued for their appearance. By appearing judges
would have accepted their commitment to a practice, well
described by Paul W. Kahn in an essay on judicial independence
during transitions to democracy as the practice of the "morality
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of citizenship". They would have seen themselves as part of an
attempt to articulate in public a sense of responsibility for the
past and the future which makes sense of the relationship between
state, court, and individual."
Kahn argues that the courtroom is a "political theatre" but
that does not make it the "theatre of politics". There is a
distinction between law and politics, which is the distinction we
have already encountered between the state and government, or the
state as an ideal and the state in practice. At the moment that a
court accepts jurisdiction over a controversy between government
and an individual, government is demoted - it loses its claim to
be the exclusive representative of the state. At the same time,
the individual is promoted into a public role - to one with an
equal claim to represent the state. The court, then, in deciding
between these claims articulates a vision of what the state is
and publicly draws the line between law and politics."
In order to articulate this vision, the court needs to be
independent. But Kahn plausibly suggests that what matters is not
the formal structures of independence, which might differ from
country to country, but "the informal tradition of norms and
expectations that develop around political and legal
institutions".5" In a functioning democracy, courts and
political institutions support each other - the "courts provide a
kind of legitimacy to the political institutions and the
political institutions return the favor to the courts".5*
Now South Africa under apartheid was not a functioning
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democracy, though the courts had a kind of formal independence
and were engaged in the reciprocal relationship of legitimacy
with political institutions which Kahn describes. The enforced
divide between racial groups in the service of white supremacy
meant that it was impossible to develop an "informal tradition of
norms and expectations ... around political and legal
institutions" common to most South Africans.
In a fraught transition a tradition of judicial independence
can at best be said to be in the process of being forged. Hence,
it was incumbent on judges committed to a democratic future fully
to take part in the opportunity offered them to debate both their
past and their future.'0 The judges could have initiated a. more
general discussion which would have set the stage for sketching
the legitimate role of judges in the new South African legal
order, one in which the Constitution gives them enormous scope
for shaping the moral direction of government. That discussion
could then have framed more particular discussions- about the role
of the magistracy, the role of the legal profession - advocates,
attorneys and public law advocacy centres - the kind of
independence reguired by the Attorneys-General, and the type of
legal education required in the new South Africa.
Such a general discussion would have to go well beyond the
suggestions in which judges and others indulged in many of the
written and oral submissions to the Legal Hearing that all is
well now that South Africa has abandoned parliamentary supremacy
for a legal order in which a written constitution, under judicial
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guardianship, protects the rights and liberties of all South
Africans.
The difference the new legal order of South Africa will make
to South Africa's future does not so much depend on the formal
differences between a legal order based on legislative supremacy
and one based on a liberal democratic constitution. It depends
much more on how those who staff the legal order do their jobs.
And when a body is set up to bridge the old and the new in the
service of constructing democracy, it is the democratic duty of
all citizens, including judges, fully to assist the deliberations
of that body.
Here I have suggested that Bram Fischer's story is exemplary
for understanding these issues. It tells us that the authority of
law depends ultimately on whether law serves justice. To use
Korsgaard's terms, it is not that we should ever expect that the
justice of the law will be better than imperfect - perhaps highly
imperfect - justice. But when the law is used to pervert justice,
used in the service of injustice, one who is truly committed to
the ideal of law may justifiably decide to rebel against the law
for the sake of the law.
But Fischer's story also tells us that that decision is more
complex than Korsgaard supposes. She sees a dilemma there, but
not that in order for there to be a dilemma the possibility of
seeking justice within the law can never be wholly exhausted. Law
has to maintain some link with justice in order to maintain even
the barest claim to be law, to be the kind of thing that makes
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sense of the idea of the rule of law.
Of course, there is no necessity that a ruler will choose to
rule through law. He might decide to rule by arbitrary power. But
even a cynical ruler who wishes to maintain the facade of the
rule of law will find, as long as there are lawyers who
understand and are committed to the relationship between law and
justice, that the facade cannot be had without the potential of
substance. That potential is the redemptive promise of the law;
and it was that promise which was the impulse of the Legal
Hearing's inquiry into the legal community of apartheid.
It is no surprise that lawyers who had been complicit in
apartheid were often reluctant to admit or even discuss the
extent to which they failed to redeem law's potential. But the
Legal Hearing will have done its task if Fischer's example hangs
over the present as a constant reminder - the reminder that
accountability to the law is also accountability to principles of
justice that together make up the ideal of the rule of law.
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55. See on these issues Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
South Africa Final Report, volume 4, 106-8.
56. Paul W. Kahn, "Independence and Responsibility in the Judicial
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